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FINANCING OF BUILDING CONSTRUCTION: LIABILITY
FOR STRUCTURAL DEFECTS
INTRODUCTION: THE Connor CASE
Plaintiffs in Connor v. Great Western Say. & Loan Ass'n 1 were pur-
chasers of homes in a residential tract development. Their homes were seri-
ously damaged by cracking in the foundations allegedly caused by the
negligent design and construction of the foundations. 3 Plaintiffs instituted an
action against Great Western Savings and Loan Association, the institution
which had financed the purchase of the land and the construction of the
homes.4
 At trial, there was sufficient evidence that the contractor which Great
Western had financed, Conejo Valley Development Company, had laid slab
foundations on adobe soil without taking the precautions which had been
recommended by soil engineers. 5
Plaintiffs sought to hold Great Western liable on two distinct theories:
(1) that because Great Western had participated in a joint venture with the
contractor, Great Western was vicariously liable for the torts of the con-
tractor and (2) that Great Western breached an independent duty of care
which it owed to purchasers of the homes in the tract. A nonsuit was granted
by the trial court, but the decision was reversed by the California Court of
Appeal. In a divided opinion the California Supreme Court affirmed the re-
versal of the trial court. It held that a lending institution which undertakes
almost total financial support of a housing development constructed by an
inexperienced and undercapitalized builder owes an independent duty to pro-
1 69 Cal. 2d —, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 447 P.2d 609 (1968), aff'g Connor v. Conejo
Valley Dev. Co., 61 Cal. Rptr. 333 (Ct. App. 1967).
2 The homes sold for $14,950-$15,950 and suffered damage estimated at about $6000
per dwelling. 61 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
3 The homes were built upon adobe soil which has a tendency to expand and con-
tract when weather conditions change. When water is absorbed into the soil, it expands
up to five times its dry dimensions; when it drys, it contracts and cracks into plates.
When he builds upon adobe soil, the contractor must utilize special techniques in the
construction of the foundation in order to prevent the cracking from damaging the homes.
See 61 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
Because of the numerous homes which had been built upon the adobe soil in Cali-
fornia, a state legislative committee undertook a study of the problem. The recommenda-
tions of the committee were enacted into law in 1965. See 69 Cal. 2d at — 73 Cal.
Rptr. at 378 n.10, 447 P.2d at 618 n.10. Each city and county is now required to enact
an ordinance requiring a contractor to engage a civil engineer to prepare a preliminary
soil report prior to the commencement of construction. If the report indicates the pres-
ence of adobe soil on the land, the contractor must require the engineer to conduct a
more extensive investigation of each lot. The engineer's report must also include a list
of recommendations advising the contractor of steps deemed necessary to prevent struc-
tural defects. Cal. Health & Safety Code Ej 17953-54 (West Supp. 1968).
4 Plaintiffs also instituted actions against certain lenders, developers, contractors,
subcontractors, and individuals involved in the development of the tract. None of these
actions was before the California Supreme Court, since the action against Great Western
was tried first. 61 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
5 There was no evidence, however, that Great Western was informed of these recom-
mendations. 61 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
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tect purchasers of the homes from major structural defects. 6 The supreme
court did, however, concur with the trial court and the court of appeal that
Conejo and Great Western were not engaged in a joint venture.
This comment will examine the legal foundations of the result reached
in Connor and then explore the ramifications of the decision. Since the first
part of the opinion, dealing with the possibility that a joint venture existed,
is merely a restatement of existing law, most of the discussion will concen-
trate on the imposition upon Great Western of a duty of care to the pur-
chasers of the homes. The imposition of this duty is a novel and important
departure from traditional concepts of tort liability. Although the holding of
the court is intended to achieve a sound social objective—the protection of
innocent homeowners from financial loss resulting from the negligence of in-
experienced and undercapitalized construction firms—the means which the
court has chosen, placing a duty of care upon a lending institution, is ill suited
to the realities of the home construction industry.
For a full understanding of the holding and an appreciation of its poten-
tial impact, it is necessary to examine in some detail the dealings among
Conejo, Great Western and the plaintiffs. Since the court places much empha-
sis upon the control which Great Western had in the development, it is partic-
ularly important to scrutinize the financial arrangements between Conejo and
Great Western.
In 1958, South Gate Development Company (the predecessor of Conejo)
began negotiations to purchase land in anticipation of developing the land
into a 2000 home community.? In January, 1959, South Gate signed a con-
tract to purchase 100 acres for $340,000 within 120 days. 8 In March, 1959,
one of South Gate's shareholders, cognizant of the fact that neither he nor
South Gate had sufficient working capital available, approached Great West-
ern. By May, 1959, Great Western had agreed to loan South Gate sufficient
funds to enable it to purchase the 100 acre tract. Great Western was also
granted the right to make construction loans to South Gate and to provide
mortgage financing to prospective purchasers of the homes. 6 Conejo, which
6 The case has been remanded to the trial court for disposition. Also, a dispute over
the costs on appeal is before both the trial court and the California Supreme Court. Letter
from. Ernest E. Johnson of Overton, Lyman & Prince to B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev,,
Feb. 24, 1969.
South Gate was wholly owned and controlled by two stockholders, neither of
whom was very experienced in large-scale home construction. 69 Cal. 2d at —, 73 Cal.
Rptr. at 372, 447 P.2d at 612.
8 South Gate also agreed under a conditional sales contract to purchase an additional
447 acres for $2500 per acre over a ten-year period. Id. at —, 73 Cal. Rptr, at 372, 447
P.2d at 612.
9 When South Gate sold its lots, it was obligated to inform the purchasers that
Great Western was willing to provide first mortgages. South Gate had also promised to
act as a conduit in obtaining the requisite credit information for Great Western. If a
purchaser approved by Great Western decided to finance with a different financial in-
stitution, Great Western had ten days to meet the terms of the other institution. If Great
Western agreed to offer the same mortgage terms and the purchaser still wished to obtain
its financing elsewhere, South Gate was required to pay Great Western the fees and in-
terest which it would have obtained if the purchaser had accepted the offer.
Most of the purchasers secured their mortgages with Great Western. The mortgages
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was incorporated with only $5000 capital, succeeded to South Gate's interest.
At about thiS same time the land was purchased with Great Western con-
tributing $150,000 of the total $340,000 purchase price 1 0 Great Western took
title to the land and granted Conejo a one-year option to repurchase the land
for $180,000. "
In September, 1959, Great Western lent Conejo $3,000;000 to enable it to
commence construction of the homes. The consideration promised by Coneje
was a 5 percent construction loan fee and 6.6 percent interest on the outstanding
construction loans as disbursed over the first six months, and thereafter 6.6
percent interest on the full $3,000,000. Conejo utilited part of the advances
from the $3,000,000 loan to exercise its option to repurchase the land from
Great Western. This transaction enabled Great Western to recognize an im-
mediate capital gain of $30,000.
As Conejo sold the homes, it referred the purchasers to Great Western
for mortgage financing. Great Western in turn charged Conejo a 1-1Y2 per-
cent fee depending on the risk of the mortgagor. If a purchaser desired to
obtain his financing elsewhere even though Great Western was willing to
meet the terms of the other mortgagee, Conejo Was required to pay Great
Western the fees and interest charged by the other mortgagee.
Although these financial arrangements seem to indicate that Great West-
ern was integrally involved in the land development, it appears that its in-
volvement was no more extensive than is ordinary for a lender in the
industry.12 Although Great Western had the right to approve the plans and
specifications for the homes and to withhold advances if Conejo failed to con-
form to these plans and specifications, Great Western did not have the right
to exercise any control over the construction process itself. Thus, the control
which Great Western had over the construction consisted of the usual inci-
dents that accompany a normal construction loan."
I. JOINT VENTURE
From the evidence presented at the trial, it appears that the court cor-
rectly decided that the relationship between Conejo and Great Western did
not amount to a joint venture. 14 Analytically, three essential elements are
generally provided the purchaser with 80% of the purchase price at 6.6% interest for
a term of 24 years. Great Western also charged South Gate a 1% fee for mortgages made
to "qUalified" purchasers and a 1-1yi% fee for mortgages made to poor risks. Id. at —,
73 Cal. Rptr. at 374, 447 P.2d at 614.
10 It is unclear how South Gate was able to contribute the other $190,000 of the
phicha.se price, but the court speculated that its shareholders liquidated assets from other
closely held corporations. Id. at —, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 372-73, 447 P.2d at 612-13.
11 This financial arrangement is known as "land warehousing." Under this arrange-
ment, the lender retains ownership and possession of the land until the contractor is
ready to begin construction. Id. at 73 Cal. Rptr. at 373, 447 P.2d at 612-13.
12 For an explanation of the typical involvement of a savingS and . loan association
in the development of new housing, see Comment, Liability of the Institutional Lender
for Structural Defects in New Housing, 35 U. Chi. L. Rev. 739, 743-48 (1968). See also
Lefcoe & Debsoh, Savings Associations as Land Develcipers, 75 Yale L.J. 1271 (1966).
13 Cf. Cothment, supra note 12, at 743-48.
14 There was also insufficient evidence to establish a "joint enterprise" relationship.
Although some states distinguish between a "joint venture" and a "joint enterprise," it
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necessary to constitute a joint venture; first, there must be an agreement.,
express or implied, to enter into the undertaking; second, there must be a
community of interests in the objects and purposes to be accomplished; and
third, there must be equal authority by the venturers over the management
and control of the undertaking.' 5
It does not appear from the facts that there was a community of inter-
ests shared by Conejo and Great Western. It is arguable, however, that Great
Western, although not legally entitled to participate in Conejo's profits, did
in fact participate in those profits. The amount which Great Western ex-
pected to receive in fees and interest was practically equal to Conejo's
expected net profit. In spite of this fact, the courts generally hold that a mere
lender of funds does not share a community of interests with his debtor. 16
Great Western's interest was that of a lender of funds whereas Conejo's in-
terest was that of a builder and vendor of homes. Neither had a right to par-
ticipate in the profits which the other received for performing its distinct role
during the course of the development. Great Western was to receive a stipu-
lated sum comprised of fees and interest in consideration for the loans ex-
tended to Conejo. Conejo was to receive whatever profits were left after
deducting all expenses (including the interest and fees paid to Great Western)
from the proceeds of the sale of the homes. Great Western, on the other hand,
was entitled to its fixed construction loan fees and interest on the loans even
if the development proved unprofitable, and its return on the loans would not
increase if a great profit were realized by Conejo.
Even if it is assumed that Great Western can be considered a profit
sharer for purposes of establishing the requisite community of interests, their
relationship did not constitute a joint venture because Great Western did
not have the right to exercise sufficient authority over the management and
control of the tract development. What little control Great Western could
exercise is not inconsistent with the usual incidents of control accompanying
the status of a lender. Although Great Western possessed the contractual right
to withhold advances if it were not satisfied that the construction was proceed-
ing in conformity with the plans and specifications which it approved, these
rights do not amount to the quantity or quality of control deemed essential to
characterize a relationship a joint venture. Great Western could not exercise
any authority over the ministerial duties of the construction process, nor
could it decide what or how many employees should be hired. Also, it had no
appears that California uses the terms interchangeably in the description of a commercial
undertaking. See 69 Cal. 2d at n. —, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 376 n.6, 447 P.2d at 616 n.6.
15 See Holtz v. United Plumbing & Heating Co., 49 CaI. 2d 501, 506-07, 319 P.2d
617, 620 (1957) ; Day, Banks as Joint Adventurers, 9 Conn. B.J. 20, 21-26 (1935) ;
Nichols, Joint Ventures, 36 Va. L. Rev. 425, 429-33 (1950).
A joint venture has been described as an association of persons, natural or
corporate, who agree by contract to engage in some common, usually ad hoc
undertaking for joint profit by combining their respective resources, without
however, forming a partnership . . . or corporation; their agreement also pro-
vides for a community of interest among the joint venturers each of whom
is both principal and agpnt as to the others within the scope of the venture over
which each venturer exercises some degree of control.
2 S. Williston, Contracts § 318, at 555-56 (3d ed. 1959).
18 See, e.g., Treichel v. Adams, 280 Minn. 132, 135-36, 158 N.W.2d 263, 266 (1968).
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control over the operating costs and expenses incurred by Conejo. Thus, it
seems clear that the relationship between Conejo and Great Western lacked
at least one and possibly two of the requisites of a joint venture: community
of interests and reciprocal authority.
II. INDEPENDENT DUTY OF CARE: THE Biakanja TEST
While the court had little difficulty in holding that no joint venture
existed between Conejo and Great Western, it nevertheless found that Great
Western owed an independent duty of care to the plaintiffs. 17 This holding is
lacking in legal precedent both in California and in other common law juris-
dictions, and is likely to produce untoward social and economic results.
Although the court still relies upon the traditional elements of negligence
liability (duty, breach of duty, proximate cause, and harm),18 it reaches a
novel result because of what it allows in satisfaction of these elements to con-
stitute a prima facie case. In deciding that Great Western was liable to the
purchasers of the homes in the tract, the court principally relies upon a six-
part test first enunciated in Biakanja v. Irving.19 This test, in effect, includes
each of the traditional elements except "breach of duty." 2°
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will
be held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy
and involves the balancing of various factors, among which are [I]
the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plain-
tiff, [2] the foreseeability of harm to him, [3] the degree of certainty
that the plaintiff suffered injury, [4] the closeness of connection be-
tween the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, [5] the moral
blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and [6] the policy of
preventing future harm. 2 '
In measuring Great Western's activities against each part of the six
-part
Biakanja test, the court has extended and sometimes distorted the real mean-
ing of the test in order to reach what it considers to be a desirable result.
A. Duty of Care
The court's distortion. of the test is exemplified by its statement that
Great Western's transactions were intended to affect the purchasers sig-
nificantly.22 The court rests this finding upon the infirm ground that the
success of Great Western's loans to Conejo depended upon the sale of the
17 69 Cal. 2d at —, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 377, 447 P.2d at 617.
18 The traditional elements of negligence are listed in W. Prosser, Handbook of the
Law of Torts § 30 (3d ed. 1964).
IA) 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
20
 Parts [1] and [21 of the test are the criteria usually subsumed under the general
heading of "duty"; parts [4], [51, and [6] are the usual tests of proximate cause; part
[3] is the element of harm to the plaintiff.
See generally W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 53 on the element of "duty," and
§ 49 on the element of proximate cause.
21 49 Cal. 2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958).
22 69 Cal. 2d at	 73 Cal. Rptr. at 377, 447 P.2d at 617.
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homes to the purchasers.23 The invalidity of this conclusion is apparent in
light of the mechanics of the transactions between Conejo and Great Western.
At all times during the construction Great Western's outstanding loans were
purportedly secured by sufficient collateral. Great Western enabled Conejo
to purchase the tract by taking title to the land and granting Conejo an
option to purchase the land. If Conejo failed to exercise the option, Great
Western could have sold the land to another purchaser for a substantial
capital gain. Great Western's advancements on the construction loans were
given only after it assured itself that the construction was progressing prop-
erly. The court also stresses that Great Western was primarily concerned
with granting mortgages to the prospective purchasers and that its involve-
ment would not have been as profitable if the purchasers refused to obtain
their mortgages from Great Western. It must be remembered, however, that
the purchasers were never obligated in any way to do their mortgage financing
with Great Western and that Great Western was assured of these anticipated
profits from the mortgages by its contractual arrangement with Conejo.
It is submitted that the transactions of Great Western were intended to
affect its shareholders and Conejo in a significant manner, but were not in-
tended to affect the plaintiff-purchasers except in a tangential way. The
transactions were intended primarily to affect the shareholders of Great
Western by providing them with a healthy return on their investment. The
transactions were also intended to affect Conejo, by enabling it to undertake
the purchase of the land and the construction of the homes. The activities
of Great Western throughout the negotiation and construction period were
motivated by a desire to fulfill its contractual obligations to Conejo, and to
preserve the rights of its shareholders to insure that the corporation was
engaged in a profitable endeavor and that the security for the loan was well
protected. Thus, Great Western's requirement that Conejo submit plans and
specifications was dictated by its duty to its shareholders to exercise reason-
able care in the lending of funds. Great Western's investigation of Conejo's
financial condition was undertaken for similar reasons. It enabled Great
Western to assure itself that the loan would be repaid. Finally, Great West-
ern's on-the-site inspections of the construction were made to satisfy itself
that Conejo was entitled to the funds which Great Western was disbursing
to it on a completion basis.
Admittedly, Great Western knew or should have known that its transac-
tions with Conejo would have some effect upon the ultimate purchasers of
the homes. However, the transactions were not intended to affect the pur-
chasers in a substantial manner. Great Western never made any representa-
tions to the purchasers with respect to the experience and reliability of
Conejo, nor did it ever inform the purchasers that the plans and specifications
were satisfactory and that the construction was being performed in con-
formity with these plans.
23 Id. at —, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 377, 447 P.2d at 617. In this regard the court empha-
sized (1) the fact that Great Western's construction loan was granted on the condition
that a sufficient number of persons contracted with Conejo to purchase the homes, (2)
the land warehousing agreement which enabled Great Western to recognize a $30,000
capital gain, and (3) the mortgage arrangements.
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For an understanding of what the California courts have meant t)y a
transaction intended to f 4affect the plaintiff in a substantial way," it is ir?-
structive to examine two of the cases cited in Connor. In Biglegnja v. Irving,?4
a notary public who prepared a will invalid because of his negligent failure
to have it properly attested was held liable to a prospective beneficiary under
the will despite the absence of privity between the notary and the beneficiary.
The failure of the notary had a very substantial effect upon the beneficiaries,
for it prevented them from taking under the will. The notary was aware or
should have been aware that his drafting of an invalid will would deny the
beneficiaries their bequests, for the drafting of a will has one fundamental
purpose: disposition of a testator's estate to the objects of his bounty. This
purpose is to be contrasted with that in Connor, where the tasks which Great
Western was obliged to perform (lending, inspecting, and appraising) were
motivated by its desire to fulfill its contractual obligation to Conejo and to
protect its shareholders' interests.? 5
Another case cited by the court is Merrill v. Buck 2° The Merrill court,
after admitting that the decision lacked legal precedent,27 found a real estate
agent liable to the lessee of a dwelling house which the agent had shown to
the lessee. Specifically, the court held that the agent had a duty to warn the
prospective tenant of the hidden dangers of the basement stairs in the house,
of which the agent knew, where the transaction between the agent and the
lessee was intended to bring about the tenant's occupancy of the house.21 The
real estate agent's livelihood depended upon his ability to convince prospec-
tive tenants of the virtues of the house. If the agent failed in this regard,
he would not be able to secure his commission from the landlord. This case
is also distinguishable from the situation in Connor where the transactions
involving Great Western were not intended specifically to bring about the
plaintiffs? purchases of the homes. Therefore, it would appear that to predi-
cate Great Western's liability upon the extent to which the transactions
were intended to affect the plaintiffs is to extend the test to a situation where
the defendant's actions were not intended to affect the plaintiffs in any sub-
stantial manner.
Once the court found that the transactions were intended to affect the
plaintiffs, the other requirements of the test were relatively easy to satisfy.
Although Justice Mosk states in his dissent that Great Western could not
reasonably be expected to foresee that its provision of funds to Conejo would
result in harm to the purchasers, 29 his conclusion is unjustified. Justice Mosk
stresses one relatively insignficant fact—that Conejo had been highly recom-
mended by another experienced lender:P The other evidence presented at the
24 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
25 Another case similar to Biakanja and cited in Great Western and in which the
six-part test was again utilized was Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821,
364 P.2d 685 (1961). The beneficiaries under a will sued the attorney who drafted an
invalid instrument.
2 8 58 Cal. 2d 552, 25 Cal. Rptr. 456, 375 P.2d 304 (1962).
2 7 Id. at 562, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 462, 375 P.2d at 310.
Id. at 562, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 462, 375 P.2d at 310.
?. (l 69 Cal. 2d at	 73 Cal. Rptr. at 385, 447 P.2d at 625.
3 ° Id. at —, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 385, 447 P.2d at 625.
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trial indicates unequivocally that Great Western was cognizant of Conejo's
lack of experience as well as its financial predicament. Since the appeal is
from a judgment of nonsuit, the plaintiffs' evidence must be given its full
probative value and any conflicting evidence must be disregarded. 3 ' Thus,
there was certainly sufficient evidence produced by the plaintiffs to establish
that Great Western could be expected to foresee the consequences of its
transaction with Conejo.
B. Proximate Cause
To adMit foreseeability is not to admit that Great Western had a
duty to exercise reasonable care to the purchasers, for the existence of liability
is dependent upon a balancing of the six parts of the Biakanja test. Also,
a number of other tort cases have arisen in California in which the court
has admitted foreseeability of harm but has still refused to find a duty of
care. In Fuller v. Standard Stations, Inc.,32 a person injured in an automobile
accident brought an action against the operator of a gasoline station who
had sold gasoline to an intoxicated motorist who subsequently collided with
an automobile in which the plaintiff was riding. Although the court conceded
that the service station attendant reasonably could have foreseen the result of
supplying an inebriated motorist with gasoline, 33 it felt constrained to affirm
the trial court's granting of a demurrer. The court perceived no significant
distinction in logic, social policy, or law between a case where a service sta-
tion attendant sells gasoline to an intoxicated motorist and a case where a
tavernkeeper sells liquor to an intoxicated person who he knows is going to
operate a motor vehicle. 34 Since California has refused to impose a common
laNV duty upon a tavernkeeper to a third person injured by the torts of an
intoxicated petson where the tavernkeeper has sold alcohol to the inebriate,3'
it also refused to recognize a duty in Fuller.
The chief obstacles to the maintenance of an action at common law
against a tavernkeeper who has sold intoxicating beverages to an inebriated
person is that the sale of intoxicating liquor is not ordinarily actionable
negligence; that even if the sale 0, the liquor is wrongful and constitutes
negligent conduct by the vendor, the sale is under most circumstances to be
considered a remote rather than a proximate cause. 1e As a result of these
obstacles, very few states have predicated a tavernkeepet's liability upon the
common law in spite of the fact that the harm is reasonably foreseeable. 37
A number of states, not including California, have changed the common law
by enacting various statutes usually called the Dram Shop Acts."
31 See Raber v. Tumin, 36 Cal. 2d 654, 656, 226
v; M. & T., Inc., 34 Cal. 2d 226, 229, 209 P.2d 1, 3 (1949)
32 250 Cal. App; 2d 687, 58 Cal. Rpte. 792 (1967).
33 Id. at 692, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
34 Id. at 693, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
35 See Derail V. Dixon, 218 Cal. App. Zd 260, 30
v. Dianne, 94 Cal. App. 2d 246, 210 P.2d 530 (1949).
36 Cf. Annot., 130 A.L.R. 352, 358-59 (1941).
37 See Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 833, 835 (1961).
38 W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 79 (14 states).
§ 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1968).
P.2d 574, 575 (1951) ; Blumberg
Cal. Rptr. 749 (1963); Pleckner
Sec, e.g., Ill. Stat. Ann. ch. 43,
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It is submitted that the facts of Connor can be more easily analogized
to the tavernkeeper cases than to any of the four decisions cited as authority
by the California Supreme Court. In the tavernkeeper cases, the defendant
has breached no duty either contractually or in tort to the intoxicated person.
Likewise, Great Western has breached no duty owed to Conejo. The tavern-
keeper's sale of alcohol to an inebriate who he knows is going to operate
a motor vehicle can be analogized to Great Western's supplying funds to
an inexperienced and undercapitalized contractor. In the tavernkeeper cases,
the court's reluctance to find a duty rests upon a consideration that the
selling of liquor is too remote to be a proximate cause of an injury caused
by the negligent act of the purchaser of the liquor. Since the California courts
have accepted this traditional rationale in the tavernkeeper cases, it is
anomalous that they so readily established Great Western's financing as the
proximate cause of the homeowners' injuries in Connor. In Connor, the funds
supplied by Great Western merely made the act of Conejo possible and did
not affect the essential character of Conejo's construction activities. In the
tavernkeeper cases, on the other hand, the alcohol supplied by the bartender
influenced the essential character of the motorist's driving and made it more
dangerous. In light of this distinction, it would seem more compelling that
the court find proximate cause in the tavernkeeper cases than in Connor.
The connection between the injury suffered by the purchasers and Great
Western's conduct is not close enough to dictate the establishment of proximate
cause. The injury was caused by the negligence of Conejo in the construction
of homes with defective foundations. Great Western's role was to finance the
construction. It was a duty owed to its shareholders and not to the purchasers
which obligated it to exercise reasonable care in protecting the security behind
the loan. Great Western's failure in this regard is a breach of its duty to its
shareholders and should not be utilized by the plaintiffs to establish proximate
cause.
C. Social Policy
Although the court has distorted the meaning of two parts of the
Biakanja test (part 1, the extent to which the transaction was intended to
affect the plaintiff, and part 4, the closeness of connection between the de-
fendant's conduct and the injury suffered) and has ignored the tavern-keeper
cases, its imposition of liability upon Great Western might still be justified
if strong policy considerations favored such a result." In this case, however,
relevant policy considerations militate against the imposition of liability upon
Great Western.
Obviously, fostering the development of defective homes is poor social
policy. However, contrary to the opinion of the court, absolution of Great
Western from liability does not promote the development of defective homes.
Contractors are the parties primarily responsible for building defective homes
and they are the parties upon whom the burden of liability rightfully weighs.
Concededly, a number of home contractors may be financially irresponsible
and may be unable to meet ordinary operating expenses even without the
added burden of satisfying legal judgments. However, this is a problem most
39 Cf. W. Prosser, supra note 18, § 49.
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appropriately solved by the legislature. As Justice Mosk indicates, "[L]egis-
lative bodies can take appropriate action to revamp building codes, give more
power to regulatory agencies, make licensing requirements more strict, com-
pel bonding of home builders, provide for industry-wide insurance."" More-
over, a legislative solution will be able to attack the problem at its source--
the existence of inexperienced and undercapitalized contractors—without dis-
torting traditional notions of tort liability.
Once again, analogy to the tavernkeeper cases is helpful. At least two
policy reasons favor the imposition of a duty of care upon tavernkeepers
but withhold such a duty from construction lenders. First, the chances of
serious bodily injury or death to the consumer and third parties is much
greater where a tavernkeeper sells alcohol to an inebriate who intends to
operate a motor vehicle. Second, a distinctive policy argument can be made
for the protection of financial institutions from remote liability. The viability
of the private enterprise system depends to a great extent upon the availability
of loans. Large capital investments, such as home developments, must be
postponed until lending institutions are willing to provide loans at reasonable
interest rates. The availability of ample loan financing is particularly im-
portant at a time when the country is experiencing a severe housing shortage,
as it is today.41
Also, it does not appear that the policy of preventing future harm would
be furthered by the imposition of liability on a financial institution such as
Great Western. Harm can be prevented only when the monetary impact of
liability falls upon those who are both situated to prevent future harm and
unable to shift the monetary impact to another person. The imposition upon
lenders of liability for faulty construction satisfies neither prerequisite. The
part presently played by lending institutions in the home construction in-
dustry does not place lenders in a position where they can control the con-
struction process itself. If these institutions take a more active role in the
home construction industry, they might violate the statutes of states which
prohibit them from actively engaging in land development. 42 Also, under
the present arrangements of the housing industry, it is likely that the lending
institutions will have little difficulty in passing on the financial burden of
liability to the contractors by increasing loan fees and interest rates." It also
seems likely that the contractors will be able to pass on these increased costs
of construction to the purchasers through increased purchase prices.'" Thus,
the ultimate impact will come to rest upon homeowners who certainly are
not situated to prevent the harm.
Finally, the conclusion of the court that substantial moral blame at-
taches to Great Western's conduct is also without merit. The court found
this moral blame because "[Great Western] was well aware that the usual
buyer of a home is ill-equipped with experience or financal means to discern
40 69 Cal. 2d at —, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 385, 447 P.2d at 625.
41 See Wall St. Journal, Mar. 7, 1969, at 4, cols. 2, 3.
42 See Lefcoe & Dobson, supra note 12, at 1273.
43 See Comment, supra note 12, at 754.
44 See id.
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such structural defects."45 The court then sympathizes with the plight of the
purchaser by emphasizing that a home is a major investment for the usual
pnrchaser. Although such conclusions are undoubtedly true, they bear little
relevance to a determination of moral blame. They once again manifest the
court's attempt to reach what it considers to be a desirable result at the
expense of distorted legal principles. The "moral blame" test should focus
on such elements as scienter, malice, or willful or wanton misconduct. Such
elements were obviously lacking with respect to Great Western's activities.
CONCLUSION
Although Justice Mosk believes that this decision will cause a substantial
restructuring of the economic relationship between lenders and builders,"
it is felt that this result is unlikely, for savings and loan associations are
forbidden by law in many states from engaging in the outright development
of land.47 It seems more likely that these lending institutions, faced with
potentially heavy liability, will require their borrowers to obtain liability
insurance. Those contractors unable to absorb the cost of the premiums or
unable to pass on the cost to home purchasers will be put out of business.
The likely result is that some of the small construction firms, which presently
constitute a high percentage of the housing industry, will be unable to pass
on the cost to the purchasers and might be forced to liquidate." As fewer
construction firms dominate the industry, competition will decrease and prices
of homes will rise.
Some lending institutions might opt for retention of the risk of loss.
These institutions will either self-insure or purchase liability insurance. In
either case, the cost of insurance will be reflected in the interest rates charged
to contractors. This result will also hasten the decline in the number of small
construction firms. The money shortage, which has resulted in the worst
housing shortage in twenty years," will reach staggering proportions unless
steps are taken to curb the increase in interest rates. If the financial institu-
tions decide to retain the risk, it is inevitable that interest rates will increase
with the concomitant exacerbation of the money shortage.
ALAN S. KAPLINSKY
45
 69 Cal. 2d at —, 73 Cal. Rptr. at 378, 447 P.2d at 618.
46 See id. at	 73 Cal. Rptr. at 385, 447 P.2d at 625.
47 See note 42 supra.
48 See Lefcoe & Dobson, supra note 12, at 754.
46 See note 41 supra.
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